INTRODUCTION
The costs associated with mounting a full-fledged political campaign for federal, state, and local offices have increased tremendously over the past few decades.' As costs have skyrocketed, so has the need for campaign contributions to cover them. For most candidates, the preferable and most efficient way to raise campaign funds is to solicit large contributions from wealthy donors The alternative would be to spend greater time and effort soliciting thousands of small contributions from a larger pool of donors.
3 While the first approach is attractive, its main criticism has been the conflict of loyalties it can create for the candidate. While she is elected by the majority in her district and therefore is at least nominally answerable to her constituents, a cynical view dictates that she owes her victory to those few who funded her campaign. 4 Once she is elected, this cynical view continues that 3 See id. at 34-35 (reporting that in order to be a competitive candidate, one must "develop a broad base of donors and be willing to devote substantial amounts of time to fundraising").
Further, once the candidate is elected, commentators espousing the cynical view claim that the candidate's concern will turn to reelection. See, e..g., HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM 7-8
she must bestow benefits upon those wealthy few from whom she has asked, and likely will ask again, for money. This conflict of interest leads the candidate toward two potential courses of action: illegal quid pro quo corruption, where money is given in exchange for explicit, requested benefits or legislative votes, 5 and legal, efficient legislation which, while facially neutral, tends to benefit the class of constituents or the industries most likely to support the legislator in her next campaign. 6 Late in the twentieth century, Congress saw quid pro quo corruption as a particularly dangerous practice and took steps to eliminate it from federal politics. In 1972, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) 7 became law, and was then substantially amended in 1974."
FECA and its amendments were passed primarily to remove actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption from federal elections. 9 Neither it nor it regulations created state election requirements. Those had to be developed by the states.
(4th ed. 1992) (claiming that many politicians are professionals with no other assured livelihood); CORRADO, supra note 1, at 35 (contending that federal politicians spend too much of their time raising funds for the next election to concentrate on legislating). REV. 1235 REV. , 1274 REV. -80 (2000 (describing how politicians design legislation to benefit certain donor constituents).
7 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 , Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972 (current version at 2 U.SC. § § 431-55 and 18 U.S.C. § § 591-610 (2000)). a Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 , Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 rent version at 2 U.S.C. § § 431-55 and 18 U.S.C. § § 591-610 (2000)).
9 Cf CORRADO, supra note 1, at 38-39 (stating that an objective of FECA was to eliminate large contributions and replace them with small gifts from an increased base of constituents). Instead, political parties began to use large "soft money" donations for party-building activities and issue advocacy-often in the form of paid advertisements for candidates-to replace large direct contributions to candidates as a major source of funds for federal elections. Benjamin L. Ginsberg, "Soft Money ": A Contributor's Guide, in CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 1990 : PACs, ETHICS, AND LOBBYING LAWS, at 393, 395 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 695, 1990 (defining "soft money" as "any contribution or expenditure affecting an election not reported pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 434... or not subject to the prohibitions of 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) or the limitations of 2 U.S.C. § 441a"). These soft money donations remained exempt from disclosure rules and contribution limits until recently. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 101, 116 Stat. 81, 82 (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i(a) (Supp. 2003) ) (implementing a recent prohibition, FECA § 323(a), on national committees and their agents from soliciting, receiving, or spending any soft money).
State legislators, mindful of First Amendment protections and their own state constitutional principles, have passed a multitude of campaign finance reform laws since FECA was enacted.' By way of these statutes, states have tried to reduce the total amount of money entering political campaigns, the amount of actual and apparent political corruption, and the effects of out-of-state and out-of-district influences over local elections, all to encourage local politicians to be more responsive to the needs of their constituents. In regard to this final tactic, at least Alaska, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington have enacted statutes designed to reduce-if not eliminate--out-of-state and/or out-of-district influence in local elections."
The line between acceptable regulation and impermissible infringement of First Amendment rights is not bright for the states. Its complexity derives from the fact that the First Amendment protects the rights of both the candidate and her supporters, but laws that infringe upon the rights of one may not infringe upon those of the 12 other. The Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley v. Valet further complicated matters by determining that certain acts, such as writing a check, though arguably pure conduct, are protected by the First Amendment as political speech.
3
The United States Supreme Court has yet to directly address the constitutionality of state laws that limit participation in the political processes to residents. There have been federal circuit court and state supreme court decisions, but no constitutional consensus has been reached among them. The failure of the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari to any of these cases has left a hole in the campaign finance jurisprudence, which has been the subject of recent litigation. This Comment explores the debate between the Ninth Circuit and the Alaska Supreme Court regarding the constitutional limits of laws that fall into this jurisprudential gap. Specifically, it examines how the two courts reached different conclusions when interpreting While the Alaska Supreme Court's opinion went to great lengths to declare Alaska's statute compatible with the spirit of Buckley, the Ninth Circuit remained true to the narrow letter of Buckley, swiftly striking down any of the defense's arguments that strayed from the constricted doctrine, usually with little justification given. Paradoxically, the Alaska law, which arguably infringed on First Amendment rights of both the donors and donees more so than the Oregon law, was found valid, while the Oregon law was found unconstitutional.
This outcome raises a number of constitutional issues for the Part I of this Comment will give an introduction to the constitutional issues at stake in the campaign finance reform debates as informed by Buckley v. Valeo. This Part will also look at selected restrictions laid down in FECA and at how the Supreme Court has dealt with federal attempts to restrict different forms of political speech. Part II will introduce the Alaska and Oregon litigation and will discuss how each state's campaign finance statute worked in practice. It will then analyze which, and whose, First Amendment rights were potentially infringed by each law."' Part III will delve into the courts' analyses of the cases. This Comment will conclude that each court engaged in questionable analysis, and that courts should recognize additional governmental reasons for restricting political speech besides those related to the prevention of corruption. In conclusion, the Supreme Court should address the issue of out-of-state and out-of-district participation in local politics in order to prevent situations where constitutional questions can be decided based on forum choice and to protect the rights of nonresidents with in-state and in-district interests.
I. BucKLEY V. VALEO AND FECA
Although the drive to reform campaign financing began in the late nineteenth century, 9 it wasn't until the late twentieth century--in the wake of the Watergate scandal-that the issue came to the fore of public consciousness. 0 Congress passed FECA in 197121 and passed amendments to it only a few years later, in 1974, largely in response to s Oregon's Ballot Measure 6 (Measure 6) was declared unconstitutional and is no longer in force, so I will refer to it in the past tense. Alaska's Senate Bill 191 (S.B. 191) was found constitutional and is still in force, so I will refer to it in the present tense wherever appropriate. At times, however, for grammatical ease, I will refer to the Alaska statute in the past tense.
19 See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 24 (discussing the Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 , ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) , amended by Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974 
scrutiny.
It reasoned that contributing money was closer to an expression of association than of speech. Because the desired expression of association could be effected by the mere "symbolic act of contributing,' any increase or decrease in the amount of the contribution would not change the quality or quantity of the expression. As long as the government had a "sufficiently important interest, 38 effective advocacy, the restriction would be upheld. The Court recognized only one sufficiently important interest in Buckley-protection against corruption or the appearance of corruption. 4 1 FECA's $1000 limit on an individual's contributions to a candidate, $5000 limit on a political committee's contributions to a candidate, and $25,000 limit on total contributions by an individual in a calendar year were found to be closely drawn to the interest of protecting against
corruption and were therefore declared constitutional.
B. The Spirit of Buckley
When considered in the context of the ongoing political concerns and the history of campaign finance reform, the Court's decision in Buckley recognized, if indirectly, that the American political system had lost the voting public's confidence and that something had to be done to restore it. 43 To achieve that end, the Court approved congressional legislation restricting campaign contributions, even while acknowledging that it infringed upon perhaps the most cherished of constitutional guarantees: freedom of speech and association . 44 The governmental interest that the Court accepted to justify this infringement was the protection against corruption or the appearance of corruption, but it required no showing that the proposed limitations were 45 preceded by actual corruption or would prevent future corruption. Instead, the Court gave overwhelming deference to the scant congressional findings that limits on contributions would serve to prevent 46 corruption. In fact, FECA's $1000 limit on individual contributions " See id. at 27 ("Congress could legitimately conclude that avoidance of the appearance of improper influence 'is also critical ... if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent."' (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973))).
" See id. at 23 ("[T]he Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests ... "). 45 Of course, the fallout from Watergate demonstrated actual corruption and the Court took note of this. Id. at 27 n.28. Congress] is satisfied that some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000." (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1975) )).
to political campaigns did very little to curb corruption, the appearance of corruption, or the strong influence that large sources of money have over national policy-which some consider to be corruption and others consider to be merely the proper workings of the political system. 47 It did shift the distribution of large donations from the pockets of individual candidates to those of political parties in the form of "soft money," thus placing a greater amount of control over elections and policymaking in the hands of (potentially) unelected party bosses. The Court acknowledged that FECA was not a comprehensive plan, it was the first step to repairing the broken political system and would not complete the job on its own.
48
In essence, the Court determined that the idea of campaign finance reform was possibly more important than actual reform itself. 49 Of course, in hindsight, it is easy to identify where the Court's predictions were flawed. The Court did believe, to some extent, that FECA would do what Congress claimed-reduce corruption. However, the Court's acceptance of such slight evidence, showing that the limitations imposed by the Act would actually curb corruption, suggests that the apparent effect upon the election process was more important to the Court than the actual effect. The spirit of Buckley is thus one of compromise and moderate activism. The end goal of 47 Compare MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 143 (arguing that, without change, "the political agenda will inevitably be shaped by an estimate of the money that donors will spend to promote a particular idea" (quoting Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1055 REV. , 1072 REV. (1999 )), with Overton, supra note 6, at 1274-77 (discussing the cycle of political entrenchment whereby incumbents seek donations from beneficiaries of helpful economic legislation). , it took another step toward finishing the job of lessening actual and apparent corruption in federal politics. One of the major provisions of the BCRA is new FECA § 323(a), which prevents the national committees of political parties from soliciting, receiving, or directing "any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act," 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i(a)(1), which is to say, soft money. " Though the Court rejected the argument that contribution limits violated the equal protection rights of political challengers as a class, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30-31, some have argued that FECA served only to entrench incumbents, reduce issue discussion, and silence political newcomers. See, e.g., DARRELL M. WEST, CHECKBOOK DEMOCRACY: How MONEY CORRUPTS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 167-69 (2000) (explaining why the major parties drag their feet when it comes to real reform); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1072 (1996) (arguing that incumbents, with greater name recognition, have an easier time raising small amounts from a large number of people than do newcomers). [Vol. 152: 1453 restoring faith in the political system took precedence over the normal constitutional constraints on the infringement of First Amendment rights by which the goal was accomplished.
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II. THE RECENT LITIGATION IN ALASKA AND OREGON
A. Ninth Circuit: Oregon Voters Don't Measure Up
Eighteen years after the Buckley decision, in 1994, Oregon voters approved Ballot Measure 6 (Measure 6),50 allowing political candidates to "use or direct only contributions which originate from individuals who at the time of their donation were residents of the electoral district of the public office sought by the candidate.
" 5 1 Section 2 of Measure 6 provided for civil sanctions against the candidate if more than ten percent of her total funding was in violation of the voting district restriction. 78 These slight differences played a role in the courts' opinions, but none was weighty enough to tip the scale. Because these laws functioned slightly differently in practice, it is informative to examine quickly the effect each had on both prospective donors and candidates before addressing the courts' analyses of them.
Both Alaska's S.B. 191 and Oregon's Measure 6 restricted, and potentially infringed upon, First Amendment rights. However, from the perspective of both the would-be donor and the would-be donee, S.B. 191 was more restrictive of the First Amendment right to freedom of association than was Measure 6. Measure 6 did not restrict the total amount of money that a candidate could receive from out-of-district sources. Rather, it limited the candidate to receiving from out-ofdistrict sources, an amount of money equal to ten percent of her total campaign funds. Consequently, if she wanted to receive more money from outside of her district, she simply needed to raise more money from sources inside her district. Meanwhile, Alaska's S.B. 191 placed a hard cap on the amount of money a candidate could solicit and receive from out-of-state funds, so that once the cap was reached, it was illegal for the candidate to solicit or receive any more money from out-of-state sources, no matter how small a percentage of her total funding the out-of-state portion comprised.
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From the point of view of a would-be contributor, Oregon's Measure 6 was more flexible than Alaska's S.B. 191 and less apt to prevent her from being able to express her association with a candidate. As an illustration consider the hypothetical plight of a would-be contributor, Calvin, who lives in California: Calvin has two grandchildren, Ollie in Oregon and Allie in Alaska, who are campaigning to be state representatives. Each of them has raised $30,000 total for their campaigns. Each has received $3000 of that total from out-of-state sources. Calvin If Calvin were not a grandfather from California, but rather a nonresident business owner, nonresident landowner, or seasonal worker, he would still be in the same position. If the courts are only looking at the First Amendment rights of the potential contributors, Alaska's S.B. 191 will constrict the freedom to associate more than will Oregon's Measure 6.
It is possible that the courts are also considering the associational rights of the candidates in their opinions and projecting any constitutional harm the candidates suffer onto the would-be donors. However, applying the two laws to Ollie and Allie, this theory does not seem to explain the courts' decisions.
In the scenario described above, Allie is still suffering more harm than Ollie-she cannot take advantage of her right to associate with out-of-state donors after she has accepted $3000.1
If we change the facts slightly, the discrepancy between the hypothetical candidates' positions grows. Assume Ollie and Allie each have raised $1000 from out-of-state sources. Each has also raised $20,000 from in-state sources. Each then receives a check for $100 from a California civil rights watchdog group praising her respective campaign platforms. Allie must return the check with a note explaining that she cannot accept contributions from "groups" organized under 82 the laws of another state.
Ollie need only return a thank you note. While both candidates can claim endorsements by the California group, only Ollie can take advantage of the right to associate with it through campaign contributions. Again, Alaska's S.B. 191 infringes more on First Amendment rights than does Oregon's Measure 6. 8o Id. Notably, S.B. 191 does not contain a clause that accounts for inflation. This means that the $3000 per calendar year limit on candidates for state representative will remain unchanged until there is a statutory amendment. s Of course she can still engage in dialogue with these donors. She simply can't accept money from them.
82 ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072(a) (3) (Michie 2002) . The reason for the ban on donations by out-of-state groups is to prevent the funneling of money through such groups by out-of-state individuals. Another concern is that other states' disclosure laws may not be as stringent as those of Alaska, allowing foreign PACs the freedom to not abide by Alaska laws in contributing to Alaska campaigns. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 49, at 185 (explaining how George Pataki, while running for governor of New York, registered his PAC in Virginia to take advantage of lenient finance rules).
There is one major difference between Measure 6 and S.B. 191 that may have swayed the courts' decisions. Allie, in Alaska, is legally allowed to spend the $3000 which she may raise from out-of-state sources. Ollie, in Oregon, is legally allowed to receive the money from out-of-district sources-he may even solicit it-but he may not "use or direct" it.13 If this was a stumbling block 8 4 for the court, it raises the issue of whose rights are being guarded. If the Ninth Circuit, as it claims, was looking to protect the associational rights of the contributor, our hypothetical Calvin, the fact that Ollie cannot spend the money Calvin donated does not subtract from the aspects of association that accompany Calvin's symbolic act of giving. 5 The Court in
Buckley noted that it was the act of giving, and not the thing given, to 816 which the associational expression attached. The Ninth Circuit panel rejected this argument as "only mak[ing] sense in the abstract" 8 7 and cited evidence that one (plaintiff) candidate refused to accept out-of-district donations from two (plaintiff) donors based on the effects of Measure 6. 8 The fact that a candidate rejected a donation, however, is not conclusive evidence that all candidates will reject all donations. Nor is it reasonable to read the statute as requiring rejection of the funds. In fact, the increased burden of having to track the segregated funds does not effectively force candidates to reject the funds. The burden is no greater than that 83 VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 1998) (Brunetti, J., dissenting). Though Measure 6 would have made it illegal to "use or direct" the out-of-district funds, there was no penalty written into the Measure for those candidates who did spend the money. Sanctions came into play only if the amount of money from outside the district was more than ten percent of the whole. That the candidate is not supposed to spend the money raises the question of what the disposition of the out-ofdistrict funds was supposed to be. Measure 6 did not specify what would happen to these funds. Assumedly, they would be disposed of in the manner that regular unspent campaign funds are required to be dealt with by Oregon law. 84 It seems that this aspect of the Measure did play into the Court's opinion. See VanNatta, 151 F.3d at 1220 (Brunetti,J., dissenting) ("[C]ampaigns will have no incentive to accept money which they cannot legally spend."). 85 One could argue that the constitutional protections afforded would-be, out-ofstate contributors by this statute are nothing more than a sham designed to meet the very lowest limits of the Buckley doctrine, while actually giving no protection. If the fact that the money donated was unusable by the candidate actually discouraged people from donating at all, arguably preventing them from exercising their right to association, then the "sham fights" argument would be much stronger. imposed by accounting and disclosure laws, which have already been found to be constitutional. 9 Arguably, the measure lessened the candidates' motivation for soliciting out-of-district funds, and it might have reduced an out-of-district donor's desire to contribute a large amount of money to that candidate, but this is the point of Measure 6. It did not however prevent a donor from contributing a token amount to a candidate to show her support and express her association with that candidate, and it did not prevent the candidate from accepting that donation. When compared to Alaska's prohibition on contributions, Oregon's Measure 6 infringed less harshly on First Amendment rights.
Perhaps this discussion of which law infringed more on constitutionally protected rights ignores the possibility that the courts were not looking to the amount of harm done; rather they were considering the reason for doing the harm and the manner in which it was done.
III. THE COURTS' ANALYSES
A. The Buckley Standards
Under the rules of constitutional scrutiny as laid out in Buckley, any restriction on contributions would have to (a) further a sufficiently important interest and (b) be closely drawn to that purpose.90 Buckley recognized the prevention of "corruption and the appearance of corruption" as the only valid governmental interest that may justify the restriction of campaign contributions.
9
Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has recognized some variations and derivatives of the in-92 terest in preventing corruption. It has not recognized any other interest to be sufficiently important to justify infringing on First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court's test for "closely drawn" turns on whether a statute "focuses precisely on the ... narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for corruption have been identified while leaving persons free to engage in independent political expression, [and] to associate actively .... , The Buckley contribution restrictions were determined to be closely drawn because they specifically targeted large contributions-the greatest potential source of corruption-while still allowing people to contribute money and time to the campaigns of their choice.
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B. Corruption and Republicanism: The Ninth Circuit's Analysis
The State's Interests
In VanNatta, the Oregon case, the plaintiffs asserted two reasons for upholding Measure 6, one being the usual prevention of corrup-96 tion theory. They also argued what seems to be the true motivation for the Measure: protecting the integrity of the republican form of government (i.e., ensuring that those who are elected are responsive to the needs of those in their voting district) . The Ninth Circuit, following the letter of Buckley, rejected the latter interest as insufficient tojustify infringing on First Amendment rights. Judge Ferguson, writing for the majority, even posited (probably correctly) that the initiative process itself, through which Measure 6 was adopted, might violate the republican form of government.
9
The majority relied on Whitmore v. Federal Election Commission 9 to bolster its case against recognizing such an interest.' 00 In Whitmore, the California plaintiffs were denied injunctive relief to "prohibit... candidates from accepting out-of-state campaign contributions."' 0 ' They claimed that such contributions violated their right to a republican form of government. In Austin, the Supreme Court upheld a Michigan law that prohibited corporations from making independent expenditures in support of or in opposition to a candidate.' v The
Austin Court reasoned that because corporations benefit from stateconferred advantages that allow company coffers to grow substantially, money that corporations spend should reflect actual public support for corporations' political ideas1' 8 The VanNatta plaintiffs contended that vast individual political contributions should also reflect actual public support, including the opinions of the residents of the voting district.' the First Amendment right to free speech and association, the VanNatta court found that it did not support upholding Measure 6.'14
In Shaw, the Supreme Court recognized that when elected officials represent one interest group rather than their entire constituency, there has been cognizable harm done under the Fourteenth Amendment:
When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy.'15
The VanNatta court acknowledged that this suggests that "states have a strong interest in ensuring that elected officials represent those who elect them."" 6 The principle derived from Shaw--that elected officials should be responsive to the needs of their constituency-seems to further the case in support of Measure 6. By eliminating the temptation to cater to the interests of out-of-district contributors, the official will concentrate on representing those who elected her." 7 However, in keeping with its by-the-letter readings, the court distinguished Shaw as the "inverse situation""" of VanNatta, representative of a small group of constituents as opposed to a representative of a small group of nonconstituents. Though the VanNatta court did not expand upon its reason for rejecting the Shaw interest in ensuring proper representation, it did state that the plaintiffs had taken the case "out of context." ' 9 This suggests that the court read the Shaw arguments as being applicable only in the context of race-based redistricting. At the end of the day, the "prevention of corruption" or the "appearance of corruption" were still the only interests sufficient tojustify infringement on political speech. The argument can be made that the official will still only be responsive to those in her district who donated to her campaign. However, in Shaw the perceived problem was that no matter who was elected, the victor would feel that it was her duty only to represent the "minority" population of her district. In contrast, under Measure 6, though an official might represent only the views of her donors or members of her party, those whose views are represented will change with the election of a different official.
118 VanNatta, 151 F.3d at 1218. In reaching the conclusion that Measure 6 supports this interest, Judge Brunetti assumed that contributions are proxies for votes-that those who make contributions are actually deciding the election. He mentioned that there is "statistical and anecdotal evidence suggesting a strong correlation in Oregon between receiving funds and winning elections."
Of course, a "correlation" said nothing of cause and effect, and did not resolve the question of whether it is the ability to raise money that influences election outcomes or whether a candidate who is already favored attracts donations.
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Just as judge Ferguson seemed to have gone out of his way to construe precedent narrowly, Judge Brunetti seemed to have gone out of his way to construe it broadly; he was much more willing than the majority to look at patterns and judicial suggestions to conclude that Oregon had a "sufficiently important interest" that justified infringing on certain wouldbe contributors' First Amendment rights. In a sense, Judge Brunetti's 124 opinion looked much more like that of the Alaska Supreme Court.
The Close-Drawing Analysis
The Ninth Circuit has streamlined the Buckley test for close drawing, determining that it is based on whether a piece of legislation is over-or underinclusive. 25 not closely drawn to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption.
The corruption that the Buckley Court had been concerned with was two-fold: (a) the giving of large contributions "to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders," and (b) improper influence over elected officials.1 26 In Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, the Supreme Court stated that improper influence occurs when "officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or ... their campaigns.", 27 The Ninth Circuit found that Measure 6 was both over-and under-inclusive with respect to curbing corruption and therefore failed the close-drawing test. The close-drawing test for campaign contributions comes from Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28. It does not look to see if the legislature has found the least restrictive means possible to achieve its end. Rather, it looks to see if the infringing legislation focuses precisely on the issue that the government was trying to eliminate. Id. In Buckley, the Court held that:
The Act's $1,000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions-the narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for corruption have been identified-while leaving persons free to engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial resources.
Id.
126 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27. 127 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) . 128 VanNatta, 151 F.3d at 1221. ' Before the court got to the issue of over-and under-inclusiveness, it raised the subject of vagueness. The Ninth Circuit, in its rush to void the measure, erred in interpreting a related Oregon Supreme Court case as saying that the word "individuals," as used in the measure, was "over-inclusive and must fail under the Oregon Constitution." Id. at 1217. In actuality, the Oregon Supreme Court did not decide the issue:
By its terms... [Measure 6] prohibits candidates from using campaign contributions from individuals who reside outside the candidate's voting district.... On its face, it is unclear whether the provision prohibits the use of contributions from corporations, businesses, labor unions, and PACs and, if so, whether it restricts use of contributions only from those entities residing outside a candidate's voting district or, instead, flatly prohibits use of contributions from all such entities. We need not resolve those questions for the purposes of this case. VanNatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d 770, 779 (Or. 1997) . What the Oregon Court declared to be over-inclusive and flawed was the Secretary of State's argument. See id. at 779 ("Assuming that [Measure 6 ] prohibits the use of political contributions from anyone except individual citizens residing inside a candidate's voting district, the Secretary of State's argument that the provision preempts any protections afforded by Article I, section 8, in this context still is overinclusive, and fails.").
because " [a] ppellants are unable to point to any evidence which demonstrates that all out-of-district contributions lead to the sort of corruption discussed in Buckley. "' 31 Judge Brunetti also found Measure 6 to be under-inclusive for failing to prevent in-district corruption. Arguably, the measure is underinclusive in that it fails to deal with corruption from in-district sources. However, Buckley affirmed that "a 'statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,' 13 2 and restated the notion "that 'reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind." 3 3
Under these principles, it certainly seems valid for Oregon to have first concentrated on eliminating out-of-district corruption before it set its sights on possible in-district corruption. In this respect, such under-inclusiveness should not have been the basis by which to invalidate Measure 6. If the aspect of under-inclusiveness that bothered Judge Brunetti was the measure's failure "to prevent large out-of-district contributions so long as they do not exceed [ten percent] of the total,", 34 his concern is unfounded. By allowing a large contribution to be made, but preventing the use of the money, the Measure eliminates all reason for a donor to expect any quid pro quo. The large contributor gives the candidate nothing which she can use and thus no reason to be beholden. This prevents exactly the kind of corruption which Buckley addressed.
C. Leveling Playing Fields: The Alaska Supreme Court's Analysis
The Governmental Interests
The Alaska Supreme Court recognized that the United States Supreme Court, in two of its post-Buckley decisions, 13 5 had created a 'jurisprudence based on the threat of corruption and the appearance of corruption, and dependent on case-specific analysis." 1 6 In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld legislation aimed at combating corruption and the appearance of corruption resulting from "large individual financial contributions.'
Most recently, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of laws designed to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption caused by the circumvention of FECA restrictions in the form of soft money. However, when it came tojustifying the restriction on out-of-state contributions, the Alaska Supreme Court accepted one rationale which the United States Supreme Court explicitly rejected.
1 3 9 The Alaska Supreme Court stated:
[N]onresident contributions may be individually modest, but can cumulatively overwhelm Alaskans' political contributions. Without restraints, Alaska's elected officials can be subjected to purchased or coerced influence which is grossly disproportionate to the support nonresidents' views have among the Alaska electorate, Alaska's contributors, and those most intimately affected by elections, Alaska residents. These restraints therefore limit the "potential for distortion." We hold that this is a sufficiently compelling state interest.
140
The "potential for distortion" referred to by the Alaska Supreme
Court comes from the Supreme Court's holding in Austin. This particular concern that Alaskans' contributions are diminished in importance relative to the money which flows from out-of-state sources is not Ct. 619, 661 (2003) .
139
The Alaska opinion actually mentioned with approval three interests of the state: (a) ensuring the integrity of political structures and processes; (b) preventing nonresident contributors from drowning out the voices of Alaska residents; and (c) preventing "distortion" of public opinion. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 616-17 (quoting VanNatta, 151 F.3d 1217) . Because reason (c) is the only one mentioned in the "holding" paragraph, that is the one I have selected to deal with as the court's recognized interest.
14o Id. at 617. [Vol. 152: 1453 an argument for leveling the playing field.
1 43 Inextricably tied to the reasoning in Austin is the fact that all corporations are creatures of state law and have the potential to benefit greatly from and amass enormous amounts of money from favorable laws, which, in turn, are written by legislators who might be bought by these corporations.
144
The Supreme Court emphasized that the statute at issue in Austin did "not attempt 'to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections, ' '145 and that "the unique state-conferred corporate structure... facilitates the amassing of large treasuries [which] warrant[] the limit on independent expenditures. Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of political contributions.
146
In contrast to Austin, the state of Alaska, as defendant, argued that the purpose of its restriction was to "prevent nonresidents from dominating the [election] process." 1 47 It claimed this interest, in fact, after the United States Supreme Court had indirectly rejected it in Buckley when it said that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... ,,14
to the candidate and then the candidate decides how the money is spent, and the candidate is responsible for the message sent to the voters and for any backlash that may come from negative campaigning. The situation in Austin was one in which statebenefited corporations were disseminating political messages.
143 A limit upon the amount of money wealthy donors may contribute to a campaign reduces the ability of those donors to garner special attention from the candidate, thus leveling the field upon which donors play. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 663, 678-83 (1997) (contending that all arguments for contribution limits are really arguments for leveling the playing field). Reformers believe that "leveling the playing field" is a necessary part of a campaign finance system that will better reflect the "one person/one vote" principle. Marty Jezer et al., Focus On: Restoring Faith In Government: A Proposal For Democratically Financed Congressional Elections, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 338 (1993) . 144 Austin, 494 U.S. at 669. This creates a cycle that promotes corruption. See Overton, supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the cycle of entrenchment).
145 Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (quotingJustice Kennedy's dissent, 494 U.S. at 705). 146 Id. Interestingly, the Court recognized in Austin that independent expenditures could have the same corrupting effect that contributions can have, blurring the clear division it made in the Buckley framework. In Buckley, the Court proclaimed that "[tlhe absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate.., not only undermines the value of the expenditure.., but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976 149 to reject the plaintiffs request for an injunction to prevent outof-state donors from giving to the campaigns of plaintiff's competitors. Yet, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that this was a constitutionally sufficient interest.
The Alaska Supreme Court did this by first positing the interest as a slight variation on the Austin interest, presenting it to the world in the only acceptable light-as a tool against corruption 50 When Austin itself is examined, however, the two interests could not be more different. Then, in distinguishing itself from VanNatta, the court adopted an extremely narrow reading of the Ninth Circuit's decision. The court rationalized that "Oregon's out-of-district restrictions applied to both nonresidents and residents of Oregon. Alaska's challenged provisions, however, apply only to nonresidents of Alaska.... Also, Alaska is not contiguous to any other state...."'5'
Finally, and most importantly, the court seemed to want to find this section of the statute constitutional. It embraced, what can be seen as, the activist spirit of Buckley. The court knew that this was a popular cause,1 2 as it had gotten enough popular support to become a ballot initiative. . 1996) . 150 The State, as the defendant in this case, argued that the sufficiently important reason for the contribution limits on out-of-state donors was to "'prevent nonresidents from dominating the process,' and that 'by restricting the influence of nonresidents... the reforms promote the valid state goal of encouraging voter participation in campaigns .... ' Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 615 (quoting the State's position). The court concluded that neither of these was a valid interest, id., and instead declared the interest to be Austin's "potential for distortion," which the Supreme Court had noted as a type of corruption. Alaska has a long history of both support from and exploitation by nonresident interests. Its beauty and resources have long been lightning rods for social, developmental, and environmental interests. More than 100 years of experience, stemming from days when Alaska was only a district and later a territory without an elected governor or voting representation in Congress, have inculcated deep suspicions of the motives and wisdom of those who, from outside its borders, wish to remold Alaska and its internal policies for dealing with social or resource issues. Outside influence plays a legitimate part in Alaska politics, but it is not one that Alaskans embrace without reservation. Thus, regardless of whether the statute was meant to prevent cor-
ruption,1 its passage alone served to lessen the appearance of corruption and restore confidence in the Alaskan political system. It also served as an assertion of Alaska's independence and drive for selfdetermination. This, it seems, was the true "sufficiently important interest."
But Is It Closely Drawn?
Once the Alaska Supreme Court decided to accept "preventing nonresident contributors from drowning out the voices of Alaska resi-S158 dents""1 57 as a constitutionally permissible interest, the court was home-free. It could not have found a way to more narrowly tailor such an interest than placing a restriction on the ability of nonresident individuals and groups to contribute money to Alaska campaigns. This prevented the specific apparent evil while leaving out-of-state individuals and groups free to engage in independent political activities.
The Alaska Supreme Court did not probe any further to determine whether the statute was over-or under-inclusive. evidence was presented that supported the need to prevent corruption in Alaska politics, there was no evidence that identified out-ofstate contributors as a source of the corruption." 9 In fact, the court went so far as to say that " [t] he State refers us to no specific evidence of corruption or the appearance of corruption caused by out-of-state contributions, and does not contend that quid pro quo corruption justifies these restraints.""' The court did point to two affidavits which claim that out-of-state donations create conflicts of loyalty for politicians."' Former Governor Walter Hickel stated in his affidavit that "whenever a candidate has to seek donations from outside the state, the candidate is buying a potential conflict of interest.' 6 2 The court quotes a similar statement from former Governor Jay Hammond, which concentrated on the appearance of corruption created by outof-state contributions. 1 3 However, no argument is ever made as to why money from out-of-state contributors creates greater conflicts, or is a greater source of evil, than money that comes from sources within the state.
Additionally, it would be extremely simple-minded to think that all Alaskans speak with one voice or that the interests of Alaskans are necessarily different from the interests of other Americans. For instance, on the issue of oil drilling, some Texas oil companies may have interests in common with Alaskan drilling companies. Also, some Alaskan environmental groups may share interests with groups from around the country. It makes little sense to argue that policy decisions that support the drilling company are valid but those that support the oil company are corrupt-the two go hand-in-glove. With scant evidence to support the claim that out-of-state donors were a source of corruption, under Buckley, S.B. 191 should not have been held to be closely drawn.
CONCLUSION
First, both the dissent in VanNatta and the majority in Alaska Civil Liberties Union illustrate a desire of courts to recognize additional 159 Id. at 615 (referring to "general evidence of the influence of money and political system corruption and appearance of corruption").
160 Id. This reinforces the notion that, although the court treated the governmental interest as a derivative of preventing corruption, the true purpose was "leveling the playing field." 161 Id.
governmental interests as sufficiently important to justify contribution and other limits. Some of the interests mentioned in the two cases were derivatives of preventing corruption; but others, like leveling the playing field, were more egalitarian-minded. It is sometimes difficult to determine where the boundaries are among the interests because they tend to intersect and blend into each other. Alaska's interest seems to have been at the crossroads of leveling the playing field, protecting the republican form of government and preventing corruption. There was enough evidence, based on the protectionist stance taken by the court, to conclude that preventing corruption was the smallest part of the combined interest. It was, of course, this protectionist position that led the court to uphold the statute. It may even be a fair assessment of the court's dicta to say that protectionism was the true interest, even more so than leveling the playing field. While protectionism may masquerade under the guise of other state interests, it is clear that states have many diverse reasons for wanting to limit contributions and expenses in political campaigns. The United States Supreme Court should recognize, as the dissent in VanNatta argued and as the Alaska Supreme Court upheld, that reasons other than the prevention of corruption exist to justify placing limits on campaign financing. These governmental interests, however, should not be used to discriminate against those persons who are not residents of the voting district of the office up for election. As argued earlier in this Comment, absent property owners, seasonal and migrant laborers, perhaps historic and environmental conservationists and others have legitimate interests in the policies and laws of the districts where they work, in which they own property, where they pay taxes, and where they enjoy significant natural and historical resources, even if they are not residents of those districts. Because they cannot vote, they must be allowed to participate in the political process to the extent that residents are in order to protect their interests.
Second, if it is correct that the outcome of Alaska Civil Liberties Union was dependent upon the forum in which it was brought, then the suit is valuable only as a lesson in litigation strategy, rather than as one of constitutional law. Now that the case has been decided, the choice of forum will be outcome determinative should any other suit call into question the constitutionality of campaign finance legislation that limits the rights of nonresidents to participate in the political process. The Alaska state courts will have to follow the precedents set by the Alaska Supreme Court in Alaska Civil Liberties Union and the United States District Court for the District of Alaska will have to follow precedents set by the Ninth Circuit in VanNatta.
It is troubling that questions of constitutional guarantees should be decided based upon forum choice. In order to correct this potential problem of intrastate forum shopping, the United States Supreme Court should not again deny certiorari for a similar case and the Court should rule decisively upon the constitutionality of limiting the ability of nonresidents to participate substantially in state and local politics. The behavior of the Alaska Supreme Court-which took so many activist steps to help S.B. 191 survive, from loose interpretations of precedent to unusually narrow readings of statutory provisions, even going so far as to invoke the history of exploitation of state resources by out-of-state interests-might be a sign of what is to come in future state campaign finance reform litigation.
In Oregon, the state senate has considered a plan to amend the freedom of speech guarantees in the state constitution, which have been interpreted more broadly than the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in order to allow for legislation placing limits on campaign contributions.1 64 While the fate of this initiative is uncertain, it would not be surprising if Oregon, in this effort or a future one, attempts to adapt the Alaska model of nonresident discrimination for its own purposes when the state legislature eventually proposes its own campaign contribution restrictions.
If Alaska becomes the popular model for states to follow in future state campaign finance legislation, that could lead to a substantial problem of state discrimination against nonresidents. Because nonresidents cannot vote, bias and prejudice against them, in terms of limiting their ability to influence politics, carry very little in the way of political repercussions for candidates--outside of losing their campaign funding. When discrimination against nonresidents becomes popular among voters, whether grounded in reason or not, it is politically exigent for representatives and elected courts to bend to the will of the voting population. This has the potential to limit and destroy the in-state interests of nonresidents and may potentially impact our federal form of government by encouraging people to concentrate their interests where they can protect them.
Lest you think that discrimination against out-of-state donors is an issue limited to states with small populations, it is worth mentioning 
